Tagging is a free lunch in conventional optimal tax theory because it eases the classic tradeo¤ between e¢ ciency and equality. But tagging is used in only limited ways in tax policy. I propose one explanation:
Introduction
One of the most puzzling features of existing tax policies from the perspective of optimal tax theory is the simultaneous existence of substantial redistribution through distortionary income taxes and the limited role of tagging-the dependence of taxes on personal characteristics in addition to income. Tagging is strongly recommended by conventional optimal tax theory because it eases the classic tradeo¤ between redistribution and economic e¢ ciency. Given the ferocity of current debates over this tradeo¤, we would expect extensive use of tagging. Indeed, the stark con ‡ict between conventional theory and the limited role of tagging in reality raises the question of whether the theory is accurately capturing the heart of the optimal tax problem. This paper proposes a resolution to these puzzling limitations on tagging that preserves the core of the Mirrleesian approach to optimal tax, an approach many (including this author) consider fundamentally convincing as a basis for policy evaluation. Brie ‡y, the idea is that the tradeo¤ between equality and e¢ ciency is not the only one that matters for tax policy. Instead, because most individuals evaluate policy using a combination of multiple normative frameworks, society also faces a tradeo¤ between diverse criteria of economic justice. Utilitarianism, the framework at the heart of the Mirrleesian approach, is only one component of a multifaceted normative perspective that ought to be incorporated into optimal tax models if we want to maximize their relevance to actual policymaking. 1 In particular, if a normative framework that prioritizes the principle of equal sacri…ce carries some weight in society's judgments, tagging is no longer a free lunch. A tax system imposes equal sacri…ce if the payment of taxes reduces each taxpayer's well-being by the same amount. Tagging distorts the allocation of resources across individuals with the same income-earning ability but di¤erent values of the tagged variable. This distortion is immaterial in conventional theory, which adopts a Utilitarian framework, but it violates equal sacri…ce. As a consequence, policymaking that gives weight to equal sacri…ce will reject a tag if the costs it imposes according to that principle outweigh the gains it makes possible through raising aggregate utility.
The principle of equal sacri…ce is an appealing addition to the standard model of optimal taxation for at least three reasons. First, it has a long history as the normatively preferred, even dominant, criterion for fair taxation. John Stuart Mill (1871) was its most famous proponent and is worth quoting at length. "For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of taxation? For the reason, that it ought to be so in all a¤airs of government...Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of politics, means equality of sacri…ce. It means apportioning the contribution of each person towards the expenses of government so that he shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment than every other person experiences from his."
Mill's vision of equal sacri…ce was endorsed by other in ‡uential thinkers, including Alfred Marshall and Henry Sidgwick, the latter of whom claimed it was the "obviously equitable principle-assuming that the existing distribution of wealth is accepted as just or not unjust." More recently, the late 1980s and 1990s saw a temporary resurgence of interest in equal sacri…ce as a basis for policy, especially through the work of H.
Peyton Young (1987 Young ( , 1988 Young ( , 1990 Young ( , 1994 but also including Yaari (1988) , Moyes (1989) , Berliant and Gouveia (1993) , Ok (1995) , Mitra and Ok (1996) , and D'Antoni (1999) . That literature established conditions on 1 Examining the degree of correspondence between policy and theory is a central task of Mirrleesian optimal tax research (e.g., Saez 2001 ). To some, that task uncomfortably blurs the line between normative and positive analysis. In my opinion, the goal of optimal tax research is to uncover the model of policy that best matches society's true normative reasoning. Given that goal, gaps between a model and policy present opportunities to …nd reasonable modi…cations to the theory or to reject a policy as suboptimal.
the progressivity of taxes designed in accordance with equal sacri…ce, and it argued for the centrality of that principle from both normative and positive perspectives. 2 Second, whether or not such normative arguments for equal sacri…ce are persuasive, that principle's connection to the broader, in ‡uential philosophical framework of Libertarianism implies that it plays a substantial role in real-world policy debates. As Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel (2002) have argued: "If (and only if) [libertarianism] is the theory of distributive justice we accept, the principle of equal sacri…ce does make sense." Sidgwick's statement above, with its caveat that speaks to the core of Libertarianism, suggests the same link. 3 Public opinion surveys estimate the proportion of individuals with traditional Libertarian views to be 10 to 20 percent in the United States (Boaz and Kirby 2007). Cappelen et al.
(2011) conduct experiments in which participants' choices imply a preference among competing "fairness ideals," and in their preferred speci…cation 18.7 percent of participants are classi…ed as "libertarians." 4 The connection between equal sacri…ce and Libertarianism therefore implies a sizeable portion of society may be described as using the equal sacri…ce principle as its main criterion for optimal tax policy.
Third, equal sacri…ce is likely to be one component of the multifaceted normative reasoning used by most individuals. For more than two decades, research 5 has con…rmed the …ndings of Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and values of economic individualism even as they try to justify their liberal preferences." 6 Rhetoric over taxes also suggests that equal sacri…ce is viewed by politicians, even those supporting progressivity, as a principle relevant to voters: e.g., U.S. President Barack Obama (2012) argued for a tax on large capital incomes by asking: "...should we ask middle-class Americans to pay even more at a time when their budgets are already stressed to the breaking point? Or should we ask some of the wealthiest to pay their fair share?" Strikingly, Mill himself provides an example of exactly this form of mixed normative reasoning, writing approvingly of both equal sacri…ce and minimal total sacri…ce (which is similar to the Utilitarian criterion):
As a government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their claims on it, whatever sacri…ces it requires from them should be made to bear as nearly as possible with the same pressure upon all, which, it must be observed, is the mode by which least sacri…ce is occasioned on the whole. 2 Lambert and Naughton (2009) is a recent contribution that reviews much of this literature. 3 Under standard versions of Libertarianism, taxes are justi…ed to pay for public goods only. Libertarian writers are frustratingly imprecise about how to allocate required taxes and how to evaluate the harm done by deviating from that optimal allocation. Friedman (1962) does endorse a ‡at-rate income tax, but on intuitive rather than rigorous grounds. One natural but rigorous benchmark for dividing the resulting tax burden is to equalize the utility costs of taxation across individuals. 4 Konow (2003) reports results consistent with these magnitudes. 5 Konow (2003) argues that "each category [of justice theories] captures an element that is important to crafting a positive theory of justice but that no single family or theory within a family su¢ ces to this end." 6 Though the connection to problems of taxation is imperfect, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki (2004) show that "just deserts" or "entitlements" exert an in ‡uence on allocations for most dictators in allocation games with production.
Mill is incorrect, as many others have noted, in the assertion that equal sacri…ce implies minimized total sacri…ce. But this mistake reveals that, for Mill, both equal and minimized total sacri…ce were principles he believed appealing and likely to be accepted by his readers. Mill's split normative intuition is more the rule than the exception, and I explore the implications of it in this paper.
The payo¤ from recognizing and incorporating this form of normative diversity 7 in the optimal tax model goes well beyond simply providing a reason to avoid tagging. A role for equal sacri…ce can improve the match between the recommendations of optimal tax theory and the reality of tax policy in several ways.
A role for equal sacri…ce can explain not only why tagging is limited in practice but also the circumstances under which tagging is likely to be optimal. Tags that are strongly correlated with underlying income-earning ability, such as blindness, disability status, and old age, will generate smaller losses according to the principle of equal sacri…ce and therefore be more acceptable to a society that balances Utilitarianism and the equal sacri…ce principle when evaluating policy.
Moreover, incorporating equal sacri…ce can explain why tagging may be rejected while substantial redistribution across income-earning abilities is sustained. The equal sacri…ce principle places no value on redistribution, but it is consistent with progressive taxation to pay for public goods if the utility sacri…ce caused by any given rate of taxation is smaller for a higher-income individual than a lower-income one. 8 Thus,
by adding a role for the principle of equal sacri…ce, we can in principle reject tagging without jettisoning modern tax theory, a possibility raised in Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) .
In this paper, I show that the potential for the equal sacri…ce principle to explain these features of tax policy is not merely theoretical. Using microeconomic data on earnings and personal characteristics, I …nd that calibrations of the optimal policy model exist in which society rejects the use of three prominentlyproposed but as yet unused tags-height, gender, and race-but accepts substantial redistribution through progressive income taxes, as in the current U.S. tax code.
Finally, if correct, this paper's explanation for limited tagging has additional implications; in fact it may contribute to resolving a second high-pro…le puzzle in optimal tax research. Diamond and Saez (2011) show that the top marginal tax rate for the United States, according to standard theory, is substantially (30 percentage points) higher than in current U.S. policy. Using a calibration of the model with a concern for equal sacri…ce that rejects tagging on height, gender, and race but retains redistribution, I show that the optimal top marginal tax rate falls by seven percentage points relative to a conventional Utilitarian model.
While the magnitude of this e¤ect would vary across calibrations, the lesson is clear: if we care about equal sacri…ce and avoid most tags because of it, we are likely to moderate our use of high marginal income tax rates at the top of the income distribution.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 brie ‡y reviews prior results and discussions of tagging in optimal tax research, including a discussion of the relationship between this paper and the concept of horizontal equity.
Section 2 generalizes the conventional optimal tax model to include multiple normative frameworks. Section 3 applies this generalized model in the case of two normative frameworks, Utilitarianism and Libertarianism, whose priorities I assume to be maximal aggregate utility and equal sacri…ce respectively. Section 4 derives conditions on optimal tagging and marginal distortions to labor supply in that model, formally establishing 7 Using the approach described by this paper to include other normative frameworks, such as the Rawlsian priority on the least fortunate, would likely lead to further insights on existing policies. 8 Also, to the extent that Utilitarian reasoning causes society to want to support low-ability individuals with redistribution, the optimal sharing of that burden according to the principle of equal sacri…ce, much less to Utilitarians, is likely to be progressive. that a role for the principle of equal sacri…ce reduces optimal tagging. Section 5 performs calibrated numerical simulations of optimal policy, and section 6 concludes.
Prior work on Tagging
Tagging has an illustrious theoretical pedigree. James Mirrlees (1971) noted the potential of tagging in only the …fth sentence of his Nobel Prize-winning analysis of optimal taxation. George Akerlof (1978) , also a recipient of the Nobel Prize, worked out the basic theory of tagging in a seminal paper just seven years later. In the modern theory of optimal taxation, tagging is a free lunch. That theory starts with the assumption that individuals di¤er in their unobservable abilities to earn income but are equally able to enjoy consumption.
If social welfare is a weakly concave function of all individual utilities, income ought to be redistributed from those with high ability to those with low ability. But, there is a tradeo¤. Taxing endogenous income rather than exogenous ability discourages e¤ort, reducing economic activity overall. Tags carry information about ability but are hard to modify, so taxing them allows for redistributive gains without e¢ ciency losses.
According to this theory, a wide variety of candidate tags exist. Any observable and largely inelastic characteristic across which the distribution of abilities di¤ers ought to a¤ect tax schedules. For example, groups with higher mean ability ought to be taxed to support other groups, while groups with a higher variance of ability ought to face a more progressive within-group tax policy. As Mirrlees wrote: "One might obtain information about a man's income-earning potential from his apparent I.Q., the number of his degrees, his address, age or colour..." 9 There are many other potential tags-height, gender, facial symmetry, place in birth order, native language, parental traits, macroeconomic conditions at age 18, and so on-all of which relate systematically to income-earning ability and are largely exogenous to the individual. Genetic information may someday provide particularly powerful tags. 10 In comparison, the role for tagging in modern tax policy is highly constrained. Some sizeable tagging does occur, but only for tags that are virtually guaranteed to indicate that a taxpayer has low income-earning ability. For example, disability bene…ts are common among developed countries, as are programs aimed at alleviating poverty among the elderly. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of U.S. federal entitlement spending goes to programs generally limited to the elderly and disabled (Viard, 2001 ). These groups are the prototypical examples of those with systematically low income-earning ability. 11 The other large example of tagging is payments to families with young children, where the per capita ability to earn income is mechanically low when compared to childless households. Other, isolated programs such as bene…ts for the blind follow a similar pattern, so that existing tagging bears little resemblance to the broad and nuanced application recommended by modern optimal tax theory. 9 Despite this quotation, age should not be considered a tag. Unlike these other characteristics, age is shared by all individuals (abstracting from mortality variation), so that age-dependent taxes do not achieve support for a disadvantaged group by taxing another. In particular, age-dependent taxes do not violate equal sacri…ce once the full lifecycle of each taxpayer is considered. See Weinzierl (2011) for a study of this and other aspects of age-dependent taxes.
1 0 Note that privacy concerns may be relevant for some potential tags, such as genetic information. A concern for privacy is one example of a value that could be incorporated into the optimal tax model using the approach of this paper, provided that it can be translated convincingly into a preference over …nal allocations. 1 1 The economic prospects for people over the age of 65 have improved in the decades since the programs designed to support the elderly were created. The current debate over raising the retirement age in these programs may re ‡ect, in part, skepticism that age 65 is still a reliable indicator of lower income-earning ability.
The main reasons why tagging may be unappealing in practice have been discussed from the beginning. Akerlof (1978) himself writes: "the disadvantages of tagging... are the perverse incentives to people to be identi…ed as needy (to be tagged), the inequity of such a system, and its cost of administration."
Akerlof's …rst and third disadvantages of tagging are straightforward but of limited e¤ect. Tags are undoubtedly less appealing if they are easily mimicked-as they would then distort behavior while failing to redistribute-or costly to monitor and administer. Most of the candidate tags mentioned above and considered in modern tax theory, however, are inelastic and cheap to enforce. Even a statistic such as "apparent I.Q.", which may seem both elastic and costly to monitor, has such large implications outside the tax system for individuals that we might argue it would be largely immune to these concerns. 12 Certainly a characteristic such as gender is highly inelastic and could be cheaply incorporated into the tax system.
Akerlof's remaining disadvantage of tagging is that it could violate horizontal equity: the notoriously di¢ cult-to-de…ne principle that "equals ought to be treated equally". This is a prominent concern: Boadway and Pestieau (2006) write: "Of course, such a system may be resisted because, if the tagging characteristic has no direct utility consequences, a di¤erentiated tax system violates the principle of horizontal equity".
Similar statements are made by, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Auerbach and Hassett (1999) .
On its own, the principle of horizontal equity o¤ers an unsatisfying explanation for the limits to tagging.
First, it is a tautological solution: it literally assumes that tagging is costly. It is also an unreliable solution, as the choice of which characteristics are to be treated as "horizontal" is, at heart, arbitrary. For example, if "equals" are de…ned by income, they cannot also be de…ned by income-earning ability if preferences over consumption and leisure are heterogeneous. In that case, the principle of horizontal equity gives no guidance as to how to resolve this contradiction.
The core of the problem for horizontal equity is that it is not based on a comprehensive criterion of optimal taxation; as Kaplow (2008) writes, it "lacks a¢ rmative justi…cation." For example, horizontal equity o¤ers no guidance on how taxes required for public goods ought to be assigned.
In contrast, the principle of equal sacri…ce is just such a comprehensive criterion that, as one of its outcomes, discourages tagging. The distaste for tagging under equal sacri…ce comes from such personal characteristics being irrelevant to the sacri…ce an individual bears to pay a given tax. In other words, rather than a requirement of horizontal equity acting an ad hoc explanation for limited tagging, in this paper a concern for horizontal equity arises endogenously out of the classic principle of equal sacri…ce. One interpretation of this paper, therefore, is as providing a normatively rigorous foundation for the concern over horizontal equity long intuited as the obstacle to greater tagging and, then, examining the broader consequences of that foundation for income taxation. 
Generalizing the Optimal Tax Model for Normative Diversity
The …rst step in explaining the limited role of tagging is to generalize the conventional optimal tax model so that the criterion of equal sacri…ce can play a role. That step requires, in particular, that the normative perspective of the model be broadened.
Starting with Mirrlees (1971) , conventional optimal tax analysis has assumed a straightforward normative framework: generalized Utilitarianism. According to Utilitarianism, a centralized planner ought to maximize the sum of the utilities of a population of individuals, in some cases applying a concave transformation to the utilities before summing. Combined with the assumptions that individuals di¤er only in their innate ability to earn income and that preferences over consumption and leisure are common, this Utilitarian framework powerfully recommends income redistribution. 13 Economists, and especially optimal tax theorists, have been largely united around this Utilitarian perspective. 14 The canonical justi…cation for it is due to John Harsanyi (1953 Harsanyi ( , 1955 , who argued that "value judgments concerning social welfare and the cardinal utility maximized in choices involving risk may be regarded as being fundamentally based upon the same principle." In other words, expected utility maximization, when the expectation is taken over all individuals in society, is pure-sum Utilitarianism.
As even a casual observer of policy debates can attest, discussions of taxes by members of the public, policymakers, and scholars do not re ‡ect such a pure normative perspective. While some individuals …nd the Utilitarian criterion appealing, others are drawn to sharply opposing frameworks. For example, Milton (2012) for a treatment of optimal taxation with preference heterogeneity. 1 4 Some important exceptions to this statement exist. Stiglitz (1987) and Werning (2007) describe Pareto-optimal taxation. Their e¤orts are similar in spirit to mine, in that they widen the model's normative perspective. They di¤er, however, in that my approach provides a way to include a speci…c combination of normative perspectives held by society, while these authors remain agnostic and, therefore, are able to provide less speci…c guidance to or explanation of policy. Related, recent research by Saez and Stantcheva (2012) focuses on marginal social welfare weights through which tax reforms may be evaluated. They allow these weights to take any positive values, including values based on principles or priorities at odds with Utilitarianism. Their approach is complementary to mine, in that they focus on the welfare weights that arise from, at least in part, the normative reasoning I model directly. Finally, speci…c normative limitations of the conventional model have been addressed directly. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) allow for considerations of fairness and responsibility with respect to preference heterogeneity. Besley and Coate (1992) allow for society to place particular emphasis on poverty alleviation. Auerbach and Hassett (1992) model a concern for horizontal equity. This paper's general framework for enriching the conventional model could accommodate these concerns.
the dominant pattern much of the time."
15 Policy driven by individuals (i.e., voters) in that interior will therefore balance these competing normative frameworks.
Appealing as it may be to generalize the optimal tax model's normative perspective to capture the diversity of moralities that drive public and scholarly debate over taxes, there is a methodological obstacle. Many of the most prominent normative frameworks evaluate outcomes in ways that are not directly commensurable. For example, Utilitarianism is a consequentialist framework, basing its evaluations solely on ends, not means. It is the most prominent example of a consequentialist framework "with additional demands, particularly 'welfarism,' which insists that states of a¤airs must be judged exclusively by the utility information related to the respective states," in the words of Sen (2000) . In contrast, some normative frameworks, such as Libertarianism, stress the moral relevance of concerns such as freedom, rights, and rules, rather than the ends emphasized by Utilitarianism. These frameworks are often referred to as deontological. A long-standing concern in moral philosophy is whether the judgments of such frameworks can be compared-for example, can we meaningfully measure Utilitarian gains against Libertarian losses?
This paper ensures commensurability by representing the priorities of each normative framework with a consequentialist loss function that depends on deviations of the actual allocation of resources from each framework's optimal allocation. Of course, some may object to consequentialist representations of deontological approaches. In the end, the appeal of my analysis will depend on how closely the optimal allocations and loss functions I use align with the priorities of the normative frameworks. These loss functions can be speci…ed in a way that respects Pareto e¢ ciency, as the examples in Section 3 below illustrate, avoiding the problem with non-welfarist criteria noted by Kaplow and Shavell (2001) .
In this paper, a social planner minimizes a "social loss function" that is the weighted sum of these framework-speci…c losses. The weight on a given framework's loss represents the force that framework exerts on society's moral evaluations. The social planner can be interpreted as either a normatively-optimal authority or, from a positive perspective, an authority that uses the median voter's preferred objective.
This approach to combining disparate normative frameworks appears to be consistent with the moral reasoning of Amartya Sen. In Sen (1982) he writes: "...both welfarist consequentialism (such as utilitarianism) and constraint-based deontology are fundamentally inadequate because of their failure to deal with certain important types of interdependences present in moral problems. This leads to an alternative approach... which incorporates, among other things, some types of rights in the evaluation of states of a¤airs, and which gives these rights in ‡uence on the choice of actions through the evaluation of consequent states of a¤airs." In Sen (2000) , he names this approach "consequential evaluation". Sen does not specify how these frameworks ought to be combined, but a suggestive passage indicates that my approach of social loss minimization may not be far o¤ the mark: "...rights-inclusive objectives in a system of consequential evaluation can accommodate certain rights the ful…llment of which would be excellent but not guaranteed, and we can still try to minimize the shortfall." Now I develop this generalized optimal tax model formally.
The model
Individuals di¤er in their innate ability to earn income, denoted w i for types i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig, with the proportion of the population with ability i denoted p i such that
An individual of type i derives utility from consumption c and disutility from exerting labor e¤ort y=w to earn income y. Denote the utility function U (c; y=w).
A planner chooses allocations
to minimize social loss subject to feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints. Formally, the planner's problem is:
where the framework-speci…c loss functions L are de…ned below;
F denotes the set of feasible allocations for the economy:
where G is exogenous, required government spending on public goods;
IC denotes the set of incentive compatible allocations:
The novel component of this planner's problem is its objective, captured in expression (1), to minimize the weighted sum of losses across a set of normative frameworks. These framework-speci…c losses are calculated through loss functions that are designed to capture the priorities of the normative frameworks. Formally, a set of normative frameworks enters the planner's objective. Each normative framework 2 implies a (possibly incomplete) preference relation on the set F, so that we say allocation c
2 F is weakly preferred under the framework to allocation c
: Given , the strict preference relation is de…ned as usual: for any c
These preference relations allow the identi…cation of a preferred, economically-feasible allocation of consumption and income across types for each normative framework. 16 I label such an allocation an " -optimal feasible allocation", denote it
, and formally de…ne it as follows.
17
De…nition 1 An -optimal feasible allocation
is any allocation in the set F for which there is no other allocation c i ; y
in the set F such that:
These -optimal feasible allocations provide a key link between normative frameworks. With them, the priorities of any framework can be represented by a loss function that measures the costs of deviations from the framework's most preferred allocation. I denote these loss functions L n c i ; y
The loss functions fL g 2 ought to satisfy some natural properties for all frameworks 2 . Speci…cally, the loss functions I use in this paper satisfy the following two conditions.
Remark 1 For all 2 , the loss function L (x; y) satis…es:
1. Ordinality: For any c
; so that the loss from one allocation is no greater than that from another to which it is weakly preferred under framework ;
= 0, so that the loss is zero 18 when the equilibrium allocation equals the -optimal feasible allocation.
The weights applied to each loss function represent the importance each normative framework plays in society's evaluations of policy. A number of models of the policymaking process could be used to generate such weights. The most straightforward is that the median (pivotal) voter has his or her own weights on each normative framework, adopted by policymakers as a result of electoral competition. 19 One implication of this paper's analysis is that future research identifying the values of these weights would be valuable.
Next, I apply this general approach to a speci…c case with two prominent normative frameworks.
A two-framework case: Utilitarianism and Libertarianism
Feldman and Zaller (1992) summarize a prominent speci…c instance of normative ambivalence documented in the United States as between "two major elements of the political culture: achievement and equality..., capitalism and democracy..., or freedom and equality...." As shorthand for this division in the context of optimal taxation, I will refer to this as the tension between Libertarianism and Utilitarianism.
The …rst step in applying the previous section's approach is to de…ne the preference relations for the Utilitarian and Libertarian frameworks that determine their -optimal feasible allocations. The preference relation for Utilitarianism is familiar from the conventional optimal tax literature: allocations are preferred that generate a greater sum of individual utilities. Formally, U til is de…ned by:
The Utilitarian-optimal feasible allocation is therefore, for all possible c i ; y
2 F :
The preference relation for Libertarianism requires more discussion. In their critique of Libertarianism, Murphy and Nagel (2002) write: "The implication for tax policy of rights-based libertarianism in its pure or absolute form is that no compulsory taxation is legitimate..." I read Nozick (1974) , the most in ‡uential modern expositor of Libertarianism, as saying much the same thing, if not so directly, when he writes: "if it would be illegitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man's leisure (forced labor) for the purpose of serving the needy, how can it be legitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man's goods for that purpose?"
The natural inference from such statements is that the allocation with no taxation is strictly preferred to all others according to the Libertarian criterion. For clarity, I will refer to the allocation with no taxation as the laissez-faire allocation and formally de…ne it as follows. These conditions are simply that each individual maximizes utility and there are no interpersonal transfers. In the statement of the de…nition, I clarify that G = 0, as this is the allocation with no taxation and, therefore, no government spending.
The Libertarian preference relation, denoted Lib ; is then de…ned as follows:
for all possible c i ; y
2 F; where G = 0:
Moving from the preference relation Lib to the -optimal feasible allocation for Libertarianism is complicated by a well-known conceptual issue with the idea of the laissez-faire allocation. 20 Any economy is, in reality, inseparable from the existing set of taxes that fund the government and state institutions. The laissez-faire allocation is, therefore, not well-de…ned, because G = 0 implies a very di¤erent economy than that the status quo. Whether or not this challenge is surmountable by Libertarians in general, it has a natural solution in this paper. The key is the use of the principle of equal sacri…ce as the core idea of the Libertarian approach to taxation.
To see how the equal sacri…ce principle implies a -optimal feasible allocation for the Libertarian framework, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that the public goods necessary to support the current economy are sustained without any cost to the economy, so that G = 0 but the status quo economic system is feasible. To a Libertarian, the (no tax) laissez-faire outcome in this scenario is surely optimal. Now, suppose that sustaining those public goods is costly, so that G > 0. The equal sacri…ce principle implies that the cost of the public goods will be distributed across individuals such that the utility loss is identical (and as small as possible) for all.
Formally, de…ne ES as the set of all feasible allocations that satisfy the principle of equal sacri…ce relative to the laissez-faire allocation: 
2 0 Another contentious issue, which I will abstract from, is whether that allocation re ‡ects any past injustices that ought to be recti…ed. If so, even the Libertarian framework may justify government intervention. If not, then the laissez-faire allocation can be taken as just under the Libertarian framework.
The Libertarian-optimal feasible allocation is therefore that which achieves the smallest, but equal, sacri…ce while funding G. Formally, we de…ne c 
ES:
The next step is to specify the loss functions for the planner.
Loss functions
The Utilitarian loss function L U til is directly implied by the Utilitarian preference relation in expression (4):
In words, it is the sum of individuals'utility losses from having the equilibrium allocation c i ; y i i deviate from the Utilitarian-optimal feasible allocation. This loss function has the appealing property that it directly adopts the cardinal welfare comparisons underlying the Utilitarian preference relation.
The Libertarian loss function is a generalization of the principle of equal sacri…ce. In its pure form, the equal sacri…ce principle is too narrow for the purposes of this paper because it cannot rank allocations that deviate from exactly equal sacri…ce (which the equilibrium allocation will do if the Utilitarian component of the social objective carries enough weight). Therefore, I specify a loss function that satis…es the following three properties: …rst, deviations of individual utility below the Libertarian-optimal feasible allocation are costly but deviations above the Libertarian-optimal feasible allocation yield little or no o¤setting bene…ts 21 ;
second, losses increase more than proportionally with the size of the deviation of individual utility below the Libertarian-optimal feasible allocation; third, gains are concave in the size of the deviation of individual utility above the Libertarian-optimal feasible allocation. I formalize these properties as follows:
where
Consistent with the …rst property, the loss function in expressions (8) and (9) applies weights and , where 0 < , to deviations of individual utility above and below the Libertarian-optimal feasible allocation.
The asymmetric punishment of downward deviations from the Libertarian-optimal feasible allocation implied by < respects the Pareto criterion but rejects the Utilitarian idea that the distribution of utility across individuals is irrelevant. Consistent with the second and third properties, the parameters 1 and 2 (0; 1]
imply losses that increase (weakly) more than proportionally with deviations below and gains that increase (weakly) less than proportionally for deviations above the Libertarian-optimal feasible allocation.
Planner' s problem
With the loss functions de…ned by expressions (7), (8) and (9), the planner in this case chooses c i ; y
to solve the following problem.
Problem 2 Social Planner's Problem (speci…c case)
V ( ) is de…ned in (9), F is de…ned in (2), and IC is de…ned in (3) :
This planner's problem is equivalent to the conventional approach if Lib = 0:
In the next two sections, the optimal policy generated by this planner's problem will be analyzed in depth. First, however, to illustrate the e¤ect of positive Lib on optimal policy, I simulate a simple model with two types of workers and show how this form of normative diversity a¤ects the well-being of individuals in the economy.
Example with two types
Individual income-earning ability is either w 1 = 10 or w 2 = 50, each of which makes up half the population, This simple example is most useful for making plain the e¤ect of normative diversity on the allocation of utility across types of individuals. Figure 1 plots the utility of the high-ability type against the utility of the low-ability type. The bold solid line in the …gure shows the utility possibilities frontier (UPF): that is, the highest incentive-compatible, feasible utility for the low-ability type given a utility level for the high-ability type. The thin solid and dotted lines are the indi¤erence curves passing through the -optimal feasible (but not necessarily incentive compatible) allocations for the Utilitarian and Libertarian frameworks, respectively.
The dashed line is the indi¤erence curve for the social planner that chooses (by tangency with the UPF) the optimal allocation for the economy. Also shown are the optimal allocations chosen by each framework. 
Analysis of optimal policy with normative diversity
In this section, I examine analytically the characteristics of optimal policy with normative diversity as formalized in Section 3. I consider two e¤ects of increasing the weight on equal sacri…ce in the social loss function. First, I show that it reduces the optimal extent of redistribution through tagging. Second, I show that it has a theoretically ambiguous impact on the pattern of optimal marginal tax rates.
Optimal tagging
To analyze optimal tagging, I modify the social planner's problem so that individuals di¤er in two characteristics: unobservable ability w indexed by i, and an observable, tagged variable indexed by m = f1; 2; :::; M g. 
In this problem the incentive constraints (14) are m-speci…c. That is, the planner can restrict each individual to the allocations within his or her tagged group, whereas if tagging were excluded the planner would be required to ensure that each individual preferred his or her allocation to that of any individual in any tagged group.
The following proposition is implied by the …rst-order conditions of this planner's problem, assuming separable utility between consumption and labor e¤ort. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 If U c;y=w (c; y=w) = 0, the solution to the Social Planner's Problem with Tagging satis…es: The left-hand side of (15) is the ratio of the expected inverse marginal utilities of consumption across tagged types. This equals the ratio of the cost in consumption units of an incentive-compatible marginal increase in utility across all individuals with tagged value m versus n. The following corollary makes plain why this ratio is of interest. 
This result, also shown in Weinzierl (2011) for age-dependent taxes and labeled the Symmetric Inverse
Euler equation in that context, shows that the Utilitarian planner with access to tagging will equalize the cost of providing utility to tagged groups. Intuitively, the planner has full information about the tag, so any opportunity to raise overall welfare by transfers across tag values will be exploited.
Next, I derive a condition analogous to (16) for positive Lib . I make two assumptions to provide a clean benchmark case. 
In words, Assumption 1 holds that tagged groups can be "ranked", for instance by some function of the mean and variance of wages within each group, so that higher-ranked groups fare no better, and in some cases worse, than lower-ranked groups when the planner is a pure Utilitarian. That is, individuals of any given ability obtain allocations that generate greater losses or smaller gains when they are members of a higher-ranked group.
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Assumption 1 is closely related to a well-known result from previous optimal tax analyses that an "advantaged" tagged group is taxed heavily by a conventional Utilitarian-optimal tax policy. Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) show this numerically for the optimal height tax in the United States, under which a tall taxpayer ends up with lower utility than a short taxpayer of the same ability. Intuitively, the planner treats those with the advantaged tag as higher-skilled workers on average, requiring them to produce more income than others. Mirrlees (1971) showed much the same result for higher ability individuals in the full information case (which is the relevant analogue) of his optimal tax problem.
Assumption 2:
In the function V ( ) speci…ed in expression (12), = 0. Assumption 2 speci…es that the Libertarian loss function takes the (arguably natural) value of zero for any allocations in which the individual's utility exceeds his or her utility in the Libertarian-optimal policy. I also apply this assumption in the numerical simulations below, as it seems to represent most accurately the distinction between a concern for equal sacri…ce and the conventional Utilitarian objective.
With these assumptions, the following corollary to Proposition 1 can be derived and compared with Corollary 1 above. The proof is in the Appendix. 2 3 These assumptions are su¢ cient, but not necessary, for the result in Corollary 2. Numerical simulations show that tagged groups may be less distinct than under Assumption 1, and the Libertarian loss function may be more similar to the Utilitarian loss function than under Assumption 2, while the optimal extent of tagging remains lower than in the conventional theory. 2 4 Assumption 1 can also be seen as the outcome of two sub-assumptions. Namely, U 
Corollary 2 If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the solution to Social Planner's Problem with Tagging satis…es
Corollary 2 is the main analytical result of the paper. It states that the planner who puts positive weight on the Libertarian framework allocates consumption in a way that leaves the cost of raising utility for the disadvantaged group (i.e., m in this example) lower than that for the advantaged group. As shown in result (16), a purely Utilitarian planner would transfer additional resources to the disadvantaged group, but the planner with this more diverse normative framework stops short, redistributing less. The numerical simulations below reinforce this lesson.
Intuitively, taxing the advantaged tagged group to aid the disadvantaged group generates costs in unequal sacri…ce to this planner. A Utilitarian planner ignores the distribution of sacri…ce, caring only about total sacri…ce (which tagging helps to minimize). This disparity in the treatment of transfers across tagged groups causes an optimal policy based in part on equal sacri…ce to use tagging less than in conventional theory.
Optimal marginal distortions
The classic topic of optimal income tax analysis is marginal distortions to labor supply. To analyze these distortions in this paper's generalized model, I return to the Social Planner's Problem stated in (10), where individuals di¤er only in ability w. Denote with jji the multiplier on the incentive constraint indicating that the allocation to ability type j is not preferred by the individual of ability type i. The …rst-order conditions of this planner's problem generate the following proposition.
Proposition 2
The optimal marginal distortion to the labor supply decision of an individual with ability type i, denoted i , satis…es the following condition.
where U x is the partial derivative of individual utility with respect to x and U i denotes U c i ; y i ; w i .
To interpret condition (20) , start with the conventional case in which Lib = 0. Then, the result simpli…es to:
In result (21), the term
is less than one for w i < w j , so that binding incentive constraints on higher skill types (i.e., ijj > 0) drive the optimal distortion i above zero in the conventional model.
A positive marginal distortion on type i has a bene…t and a cost in conventional theory. The bene…t of such a distortion is that it allows the planner to o¤er a more generous tax treatment to i without tempting higher-skilled individuals to claim it. The greater the gain in social welfare due to this redistribution from higher earners to i (measured by ijj for w j > w i in both expressions), the greater is the optimal distortion to i. The conventional cost of such a distortion is the reduced e¤ort and, therefore, output from type i. The size of this cost increases with the share of i in the population, p i , explaining why p i enters expression (21) as the …rst term in both the numerator and denominator, pushing the distortion toward zero as p i increases.
If Lib > 0, comparing results (20) and (21) shows that both the bene…ts and costs of optimal marginal distortions are a¤ected, yielding an ambiguous overall impact of normative diversity on marginal tax rates. > 1, while a larger Lib will decrease these terms and raise the optimal distortion on i if
measures the marginal reduction in social loss from raising the allocated utility of type i. Starting from the Utilitarian allocation, where Lib = 0, this reduction in loss will be greater for the high-skilled, as their allocated utilities will be far below the laissez-faire allocation. Raising the utilities of lower-skilled individuals will, in contrast, have smaller e¤ects on social loss because they are already receiving higher utilities than in the laissez-faire.
is likely to be increasing in type because losses increase more than proportionally with deviations below the laissez-faire allocation and gains are concave in deviations above it 25 . This e¤ect of increasing Lib will tend to be a decrease in the optimal distortions on higher-skilled workers relative to lower-skilled workers.
Second, the bene…ts of redistribution change when the planner puts weight on equal sacri…ce. In particular, the social value of redistributing from higher-skilled to lower-skilled and moderate-skilled individuals ( ijj for w j > w i ) is less, because the planner values proximity to the laissez-faire allocation and places less value on individuals enjoying utilities that exceed the laissez faire (e.g., low earners). With smaller bene…ts from redistributing to the low-and moderate-skilled individuals, the required distortions on them are smaller. Therefore, this e¤ect of increasing Lib will tend to decrease the optimal distortions on lowand moderate-skilled workers relative to higher-skilled workers.
The ambiguity in the e¤ects of positive Lib on optimal marginal tax rates indicates the general di¢ culty in obtaining de…nitive results from condition (20) . For a more comprehensive characterization of optimal income taxes with normative diversity, I turn to calibrated numerical simulations in the next section.
Numerical results
In this section I study the e¤ect of normative diversity on optimal tagging and income taxation through numerical simulations calibrated to micro-level data for the United States. First, I consider three prominent potential tags-height, gender, and race-and show that this paper's approach can reconcile the rejection of all of these tags with the acceptance of redistributive income taxes driven by di¤erences in income-earning ability. 26 I then choose a model parameterization that rejects these tags and use it to simulate optimal income taxes using a more detailed ability distribution. This latter simulation yields substantial redistribution, progressive average tax rates, and a pro…le of marginal tax rates resembling that in Saez (2001) but with a lower maximum rate. This last …nding relates to the puzzle identi…ed in Diamond and Saez (2011) that the conventional model implies substantially higher peak marginal rates than those prevailing in current policy.
Optimal tagging with normative diversity
For the optimal policy simulations, I will use the following parameter values in the Social Planner's Problem with Tagging: Table 1 : Parameter values The data required for the simulation of the optimal height, gender, and race taxes are ability distributions by tagged type. I classify respondents to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth into three height categories, two gender categories, and two race categories. 27 For height, I use gender-dependent ranges, as the height distributions of males and females are substantially di¤erent: for men the thresholds are 70 and 72 inches; for women the thresholds are 63 and 66 inches. Table 2 lists the twelve tagged groups that these divisions generate in descending order of their mean wage, where the wage is reported earnings divided by reported hours in 1996. 28 The table also shows the mean and standard deviation of each group's reported wages, and each group's sample size in the NLSY. The di¤erences in wages among these twelve tagged groups are substantial. The highest-earning group in Table 2 earns a mean wage nearly 70 percent greater than the lowest-earning group. Overall, average wages are higher for those who are tall, male, and white. Appendix Table 1 provides more detail than   Table 2 , reporting the distributions of the members of the tagged groups across ten wage bins. These wage distributions are the second key input to the numerical simulations (in addition to the assumed parameters in Table 1 ).
For each of the four parameter vectors implied by Table 1 , I report measures of the optimal extent of tagging and income tax progressivity in Table 3 and Table 4 , respectively.
To measure the extent of tagging, Table 3 reports the "extra" average tax paid by or transfer made to the members of each tagged group as a share of their income when the planner can use tagging as compared to when it cannot. 29 More speci…cally, this is the ratio of total tax payments to total income for each group under the optimal policy less the same ratio under the constrained-optimal policy with no tagging. If that di¤erence is positive, the group is paying taxes in addition to what they would pay if tagging were prohibited.
If that di¤erence is negative, they are receiving an extra transfer. For reference, I report the same statistic for the policy solution when Lib = 0, the fully Utilitarian (conventional Mirrleesian) planner. To gauge the progressivity of the optimal income tax, Table 4 reports the average tax rate paid by the members of each wage range under each parameterization. Finally, Table 5 shows the welfare gain obtainable from tagging in each case. To compute this welfare gain, I calculate the increase in consumption for all individuals that would lower the total social loss under the policy without tagging to the level of total social loss obtained by the optimal policy. The results in these three tables show that incorporating a concern for equal sacri…ce can explain the simultaneous rejection of tagging and acceptance of substantial income redistribution through progressive taxes observed in policy. Table 3 shows that equal sacri…ce dramatically reduces the appeal of tagging according to height, gender, and race, despite the substantial information that these three tags carry about income-earning ability. While large group-speci…c taxes and transfers are optimal when Lib = 0 and none are optimal once Lib = 1 (not shown), even seemingly modest values for Lib generate a steep decline in the use of tags. At the same time, for these values of Lib , Table 4 shows that in all cases the extent of redistribution and progressivity remains quite high when measured by either the maximal average tax rate or the gap between the maximal and minimal average tax rates. Table 5 shows that the welfare gains one might achieve through tagging are estimated to be large in the conventional case of Lib = 0 but are negligible in all other cases.
As a speci…c example, consider the parameterization in which Lib = 0:20 and = 10. The optimal tagbased tax is 0.9 percent of the highest-earning group's total income in this parameterization, whereas the conventional model suggests a tax of 13.6 percent. Consistent with this reduced role for tagging, the welfare gain from tagging in this parameterization is negligible: translated into the magnitudes of the current U.S. As Figure 2 makes clear, the optimal policy according to the mixed social loss function is substantially redistributive and much more closely resembles the pure Utilitarian, conventional optimal policy than the policy that prioritizes only equal sacri…ce.
The intuition for these results is as follows. The principle of equal sacri…ce is consistent with the use of progressive taxes to pay for public goods if the utility sacri…ce caused by any given rate of taxation is smaller for a higher-income individual than a lower-income one. But, that principle places no value on redistribution (the average tax rate on the lowest-ability type is positive when Lib = 1:0). Similarly, while both Utilitarians and Libertarians value the e¢ ciency advantage of tagging, it violates the equal sacri…ce principle because tagged personal characteristics have no bearing on individual utility. Altogether, the introduction of equal sacri…ce considerations into the evaluation of outcomes causes optimal policy to move away from redistribution and, especially, tagging. For the range of parameters considered here, those e¤ects are enough to make the optimal extent of tagging on height, gender, and race negligible but leave substantial redistribution and progressivity intact.
As this intuitive explanation suggests, the key forces determining the optimal extent of tagging in this model will apply to di¤erent degrees for di¤erent tags. Most important, the costs that tagging generates from the perspective of the equal sacri…ce principle will be smaller when a tag is closely correlated with ability. If a tag were a perfect indicator of ability, it would generate no costs according to equal sacri…ce.
Given that such a tag would continue to generate e¢ ciency gains by being inelastic to taxation, it would be more valuable to the social planner. In other words, the model suggests that personal characteristics are more likely to be used as tags when they provide stronger and more reliable signals of income-earning ability.
This conclusion is consistent with the limited ways in which tagging is currently used. Blindness, disability, and dependent children are three tags for which income-earning ability (per person) is highly likely to be low. Bene…t programs for the elderly may not appear at …rst glance as well-suited to the theory, but it is important to recall that improvements in medical care have made the elderly of today much healthier than their predecessors. In fact, the current debate over raising the retirement age because of increased lifespans and plausible working lives is consistent with the lessons of this model.
Optimal income taxes
In this section, I explore the e¤ects on optimal income taxes of assigning a su¢ ciently large role to equal sacri…ce in the social loss function that optimal tagging is negligible for the three prominent characteristics examined in the previous section, height, gender, and race. In particular, I assume Lib = 0:20, re ‡ecting a weight of 20 percent on the Libertarian framework, and = 10 as the loss aversion factor in the Libertarian loss function from Table 1 . All other parameters are as in Table 1 . 31 In the previous simulation, this combination of parameters yielded an optimal policy with minimal tagging and a top average income tax rate of 49 percent (this is also the case shown in Figure 2 ). For the data, I use a lognormal-Pareto calibration of the U.S. wage distribution that extends to a wage of $150, originally calculated by Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009). 32 Average tax rates are (y c) =y and marginal tax rates are as in (20) . Figure 3 shows that marginal tax rates have the U-shape introduced by Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) whether Lib = 0 or 0:20, though positive Lib does lead to lower rates for all workers. The e¤ect of the second factor highlighted in the discussion of result (20) is particularly apparent, in that optimal marginal rates decline over a wider range of the ability distribution when Lib is positive. The explanation for this pattern is that the planner with Lib > 0 redistributes less from high earners. This reduces the high earners' temptation to mimic moderate income earners and thus the required distortions on the latter.
The optimal marginal income tax rate at high incomes falls substantially, by about seven percentage points, with this role for the principle of equal sacri…ce. Therefore, this paper's explanation for the limited use of tagging may help address a second puzzling gap between conventional theory and existing policy:
the low marginal tax rates at high incomes in policy relative to what theory recommends. 33 That gap is stated clearly by Diamond and Saez (2011) , who derive a formula for the optimal marginal tax rate on high incomes as a function of utility parameters and the shape of the ability distribution. They conclude that the optimal top rate is "73 percent, substantially higher than the current 42.5 percent top US marginal tax rate (combining all taxes)." The top rate in the mixed policy shown in Figure 3 These simulations show, therefore, that variation in unobserved income-earning ability remains a powerful force for redistribution in a modi…cation of the conventional optimal tax model that includes su¢ cient weight on the principle of equal sacri…ce to reject di¤erentiated taxation according to height, gender, and race. At the same time, this form of normative diversity does lower optimal marginal distortions to levels closer to that which we observe in reality.
Conclusion
Modern optimal tax research is inherently normative. Though controversial, being normative is also key to the literature's appeal, as it enables economists to apply their tools to a task of substantial importance: the design of the tax system. A normative research agenda is only as relevant as its normative framework, however, and herein lies a problem. Optimal tax research has yet to adopt a normative framework that captures the diverse content of debates over taxes among the public, policymakers, or scholars of economic justice. 34 This paper argues that one speci…c manifestation of this problem is the conventional optimal tax model's recommendation of substantial tagging, the tailoring of taxes to personal characteristics. Though the theoretical case for widespread tagging has been clear for nearly four decades, policy includes tagging in only limited ways.
In this paper, I propose a way to expand the normative scope of optimal tax research to include moral frameworks other than the Utilitarianism that has dominated analysis since Mirrlees (1971) . This expansion is intended to bring optimal tax research closer to, and therefore make it more relevant for, real-world debates in which normative heterogeneity plays a substantial role.
I then apply this general approach to include a speci…c alternative normative priority, the classic principle of equal sacri…ce, and show that doing so can explain the limited role of tagging in policy. Equal sacri…ce is a principle of long-standing importance in tax theory and is associated with in ‡uential Libertarian views of economic justice. With a social objective function that includes a role for equal sacri…ce, the Utilitarian gains from tagging must be weighed against the costs it generates in unequal sacri…ce. 35 Not all tags are equal in this model: a tag generates greater costs in unequal sacri…ce the weaker is its correlation to ability.
Thus, this model can explain not only the rejection of most tags but also the few cases in which tagging is used in real-world policy: i.e., in bene…ts for the elderly, disabled, and parents of young children.
In addition, this explanation for the limited role of tagging has implications for income taxes that further increase its appeal. First, it preserves the conventional theory's justi…cation for redistribution based on unobserved ability. Second, it has the potential to explain why marginal income tax rates at high incomes are not as large in reality as conventional theory would recommend, a prominent puzzle in recent research.
In sum, incorporating into the theory of optimal taxation the principle of equal sacri…ce substantially improves the match between that theory's recommendations and the reality of tax policy.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
The …rst-order condition of the planner's problem with respect to c i;m is: where F is the multiplier on the feasibility constraint and jji;m is the multiplier on the incentive constraint that type i prefers its allocation to any other type j, for any group m. In deriving this condition, I used separability in the utility function to set The analogous condition applies for c i;n , where n indicates a di¤erent tagged group: Combining these conditions, we can write: 
Three possibilities must be considered, depending on the positions of the planner's chosen allocations relative to the Libertarian-optimal allocations. 
This holds due to Assumption 1.
Imposing Assumption 1 implies that for some i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig, either condition (23) or (24) will hold with a strict inequality.
Therefore, we have shown that condition (22) is satis…ed as a weak inequality for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig and satis…ed with a strict inequality for at least one i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig:
Wage distributions by tagged group
The following table lists the wage distributions by tagged group. The representative wage rate in each bin is the mean wage across the population within that bin range.
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